Files
Max LvandClaude 50f1ae54f7 Fix findings from the security audit (#3083)
* Fix findings from the security audit

Remote:
- TCP: handshake/connect deadlines follow --timeout instead of a 24h
  minimum, so idle sockets can no longer fill the connection pool.
- ACL: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are matched against the IPv4 lists.
- UDP server now enforces the peer ACL and the outbound block list.
- ACL loading fails closed on bad files or invalid entries.
- TCP half-close is relayed instead of tearing the connection down.
- AEAD-2022 UDP sessions are created only after timestamp/replay checks.

ss-manager:
- Owner-only conf files (deleted on remove), 0600 control socket,
  umask 022, safe working directory, loopback-only IP addresses,
  per-user sender check on Linux, plugins only over the UNIX socket.
- Port canonicalisation, list() overflow, add/remove waits for the
  server, stale pid files can't signal unrelated processes.

Also: plugins drop to --user, daemonize readiness/pid file handling,
resolver cancellation, replay-filter fail-closed, key wiping, spec
strictness in AEAD/2022 parsing, JSON surrogate validation, ss:// plugin
name checks, embedding API state reset, Android protect_socket replies.

Adds tests/test_server_acl.py and tests/test_half_close.py and extends
the manager, ACL, AEAD-2022 and ssurl tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix CI on Ubuntu 26.04 runners; use string_view over raw string pointers

- Define _GLIBCXX_NO_ASSERTIONS: libstdc++ 15 enables assertions at -O0,
  which pulls __glibcxx_assert_fail (C++ runtime) into the programs.
- test_redir_qemu: boot the guest with -cpu max so the runner's glibc
  loader runs under TCG.
- find_program: std::string_view PATH splitting into a fixed buffer, no
  heap and no null snprintf destination (GCC -Wformat-truncation).
- manager: parse /proc/net/udp numbers with strtoul (cert-err34-c);
  walk /proc/<pid>/cmdline with std::string_view.
- ssurl: sanitise the tag through std::span.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* coverage: tolerate gcov 15 lambda inconsistencies in lcov 2

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* resolver: replace init's cleanup lambda with a member; lcov --list ignores inconsistent

gcov 15 marks the lambda as not hit while its lines are, which lcov 2
rejects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 09:34:36 +08:00

114 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown

\page ss-manager ss-manager
\brief ss-server controller for multi-user management and traffic statistics
\section ss_manager_synopsis SYNOPSIS
`ss-manager [options]`
\section ss_manager_description DESCRIPTION
*shadowsocks-c* is a lightweight and secure socks5 proxy.
It is a port of the original shadowsocks created by clowwindy.
*shadowsocks-c* is written in pure C and takes advantage of libuv to
achieve both high performance and low resource consumption.
*shadowsocks-c* consists of five components.
ss-manager(1) is a controller for multi-user management and
traffic statistics, using UNIX domain socket to talk with ss-server(1).
Also, it provides a UNIX domain socket or IP based API for other software.
About the details of this API, please refer to the following `PROTOCOL`
section.
\section ss_manager_options OPTIONS
Options include all supported platform variants; restrictions are noted below.
\snippet{doc} manager.cpp cli-options
\section ss_manager_protocol PROTOCOL
ss-manager(1) provides several APIs through UDP protocol:
**Send UDP commands in the following format to the manager-address provided to ss-manager(1):**
```text
command: [JSON data]
```
**To add a port:**
```text
add: {"server_port": 8001, "password":"7cd308cc059"}
```
**To remove a port:**
```text
remove: {"server_port": 8001}
```
**To receive the traffic statistics:**
```text
ping
```
**The format of the traffic statistics:**
```text
stat: {"8001":11370}
```
There is no way to reset the traffic statistics, unless you remove the port and add it again
\section ss_manager_security SECURITY
The protocol carries no credentials, so ss-manager decides who may use it by
where commands come from:
- A UNIX domain socket (recommended) is created with mode 0600, owned by the
user ss-manager runs as (or by the `-a` user its servers run as).
- An IP manager address must be a loopback one; any other is refused. On
Linux a datagram is obeyed only if its source socket belongs to the same
user, root, or the `-a` user; elsewhere any local user can reach a
loopback address, so prefer the UNIX socket there.
- A per-server `plugin` names a program to run and is accepted only over the
UNIX socket.
The working directory (`-D`) holds each server's configuration, with its
password, in owner-only files that are deleted when the port is removed; it
must be owned by the user running ss-manager and writable by nobody else.
`add` answers once the new ss-server is serving (or has failed), within ten
seconds.
\section ss_manager_example EXAMPLE
To use ss-manager(1), First start it and specify necessary information.
Then communicate with ss-manager(1) through UNIX Domain Socket using UDP
protocol:
```
# Start the manager. Arguments for ss-server will be passed to generated
# ss-server process(es) respectively.
ss-manager --manager-address /tmp/manager.sock --executable $(which ss-server) -s example.com -m aes-256-gcm -c /path/to/config.json
# Connect to the socket. Using netcat-openbsd as an example.
# You should use scripts or other programs for further management.
nc -Uu /tmp/manager.sock
```
After that, you may communicate with ss-manager(1) as described above in the
`PROTOCOL` section.
\section ss_manager_see_also SEE ALSO
ss-local(1),
ss-server(1),
ss-tunnel(1),
ss-redir(1),
shadowsocks-libev(8),
iptables(8),
/etc/shadowsocks-libev/config.json